Michigan Law Review
Volume 71

Issue 2

1972

The Concurrent State and Local Regulation of Marijuana: The
Validity of the Ann Arbor Marijuana Ordinance
Michigan Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michigan Law Review, The Concurrent State and Local Regulation of Marijuana: The Validity of the Ann
Arbor Marijuana Ordinance, 71 MICH. L. REV. 400 (1972).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol71/iss2/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

The Concurrent State and Local Regulation of
Marijuana: The Validity of the Ann Arbor
Marijuana Ordinance
The City Council of Ann Arbor, Michigan, has recently amended
the City's "marijuana ordinance" so that it prohibits the possession,
control, use, giving away, or sale of marijuana, and specifies a five
dollar fine as punishment for violations of the ordinance.1 The State
of Michigan has also legislated to prohibit marijuana-related activities, specifying a number of different offenses with penalties ranging
as high as four years in prison, or a 2,000 dollar fine, or both.2 By
1. ANN .ARBOR, MICH., CITY CODE, tit. IX, ch. 108, § 9:62(29) (1972):
No person shall: Have in his or her possession or under his or her control or
use or give away or sell marijuana or cannabis which is defined as all parts of the
plant cannabis sativa L., whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, deriva•
tive, mixture or preparation of the plant, its seeds or resin. It does not include
the mature stalks of the plant, fiber produced from the stalks, oil or cake made
from the seeds of the plant, any other compounds, manufacture, sale, derivative,
mixture or preparation of the mature stalks, except the resin extracted therefrom,
fiber oil or cake, or the sterilized seed of the plant which is incapable of germina•
tion, unless such possession, control or use is pursuant to a license or prescription
as provided in Public Act 196 of 1971, as amended.
Any violation of this Section shall be subject to a sentence of up to five dollars
($5.00) including judgment fee and costs, and no probation or any other punitive
or rehabilitative measure shall be imposed; provided, however, that this Section
shall not be construed to prohibit deferred sentencing. The District Court Clerk
shall accept any plea of guilty which is made in the same manner as pleas of
guilty are accepted at the parking Violations Bureau of the Fifteenth District
Court. Persons pleading guilty of violation of this Section shall be allowed to
tender the sum of five dollars ($5.00) to the District Court Clerk as a full and com•
plete satisfaction of liability, and no appearance before a District Judge shall be
required. In any prosecution for the violation of this section the burden of establishing any license or prescription shall be upon the defendant but this does not
shift the burden of proof for the violation.
The City Council of the City of Ann Arbor specifically determines that the regulations herein contained concerning marijuana are necessary to serve the local
purpose of providing just and equitable legal treatment of the citizens of this community, and in particular of the youth of the community who are present here as
University students or otherwise, and to preserve the respect of citizens for the law
and its processes.
2, The Controlled Substances Act of 1971, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 335.301-.867
(Supp. 1972) provides an extensive regulation of drugs in Michigan. MICH. COMP. Uws
ANN. § 335.341 (Supp. 1972) states:
(1) Except as authorized by this act, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture,
deliver or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance,
Any person who violates this subsection with respect to:
(c) • : •• marijuana, is guilty of a felony and upon conviction may be imprisoned
for not more than 4 years or fined not more than $2,000.00, or both,
(2) Possession of more than 2 ounces of marijuana is prima fade evidence of possession with intent to deliver.
(4) It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled
substance unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid
prescription or order of a practitioner while acting m the course of his professional
practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this act, Any person who violates
this subsection with respect to:
(d) • Marijuana, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for
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enacting the ordinance, the City government has minimized the criminal sanctions for an activity it has found essentially benign, pursuant
to certain local purposes.8 Since, however, there is concurrent exercise of control over marijuana by both a municipality and the State
several issues for judicial determination arise concerning the constitutionality of the local ordinance.4 Michigan cities are authorized by
constitution and by statute to act only with respect to local concerns,
and thus the courts must first determine whether the Ann Arbor
marijuana ordinance deals with a "municipal concern" as defined by
law. If the ordinance is found to deal with a problem within the ambit of permissible local authority, the courts must then consider
whether the state legislation in the area of marljuana control has preempted the field, rendering ultra vires any municipal efforts at additional control. If the state marijuana laws are found to be nonpreemptive, then the Ann Arbor ordinance will be allowed to stand unless it is found to be "in conflict" with the provisions of the state law.
In addition, the question arises whether the coexistence of the ordinance and the statute vests an impermissible degree of discretion in
the prosecuting officer. Finally, in order to evaluate the impact of the
ordinance it must be determined whether successive prosecutions by
the City and the State for the same illegal activities would constitute
double jeopardy in violation of the constitutions of Michigan or the
United States.
Beyond the immediate interest of the City of Ann Arbor, the adjudication of the constitutionality of the ordinance will be significant
as a measure of the extent to which municipalities may proceed at
variance with state law in effecting independent responses to problems that relate to both local and statewide interests.
not more than I year in the county jail or by a fine of not more than $1,000.00,
or both.
(5) It is unlawful for a person to use a controlled substance unless the substance
was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a
practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or except as
otherwise authorized by this act. Any person who violates this subsection with
respect to:
(d) Marijuana is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for
not more than 90 days in the county jail or by a fine of not more than $100.00, or
both.
In addition MICH. Co.MP. LAws .ANN. § 385.346(2) (Supp. 1972) provides that
any person who distributes marijuana without remuneration and not to further
commercial distribution and who does not violate subsection (I) is guilty of a mis•
demeanor and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than I year in the
county jail or fined not more than $1,000.00, or both, unless the distribution is
in accordance with federal law or the law of this state.
Subsection (I) of this provision authorized penalties double those listed in section
335.341(1) for the distribution of a controlled substance by a person over 18 years of
age to a person under 18 who is at least 5 years his junior.
3. See notes 26-36 infra and accompanying text.
4. See generally Note, Conflicts Between State Statutes and Municipal Ordinances,
72 HARV. L. R.Ev. 737 (1959).
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The enactment of the home-rule provisions of Michigan, as in
many other states, was presumably in response to the unsatisfactory
condition of city-state relations during the latter part of the nineteenth century; 5 state legislatures of the period, which were controlled by the rural populace, were notorious for meddling in municipal affairs and for their abuses of the so-called "special acts" relating
to cities.6 The home-rule amendments to the constitutions of the
various states may be self-executing,7 or may require or authorize the
legislature to enact enabling home-rule legislation.8
The states have also manifested variations in the scope of the
home-rule powers afforded the cities. The California constitution,
for example, empowers cities to enact and enforce ordinances in respect to municipal affairs, "subject only to the restrictions and limitations provided in their several charters .... " 9 This language has been
interpreted by the California courts to give cities supreme control
over municipal affairs. Indeed, the cities are "independent of general
laws upon municipal affairs. Upon such affairs the general law is of
no force." 10 Michigan, on the other hand, has granted to cities the
home-rule powers over municipal concerns, "subject to the constitution and general laws of the state."11 Unlike California's home-rule
cities, municipalities in Michigan exercise concurrent control with
the State over matters of municipal concern, and the state authority is
supreme. The operative effect of the home-rule provisions of any
state depends, however, upon the judicial interpretation of the scope
of the home-rule powers. Thus, the broad constitutional grant of
power to California cities is limited by the judicial construction
given to the concept of "municipal affairs."12 Conversely, though
5. A. BROMAGE, INTRODUCTION TO MUNICIPAL GoVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 157
(1950).
6. Id. The concept of home-rule is consonant with the emphasis on "community
control'' which has recently arisen in education as well as in other areas. Cf. Kirp,
Community Control, Public Policy, and the Limits of Law, 68 MICH. L. REY. 1389
(1970). Home-rule and local control are intended to guard against arbitrary legislation
by keeping decision-making close to the people to be governed. Fordham, DecisionMaking in Expanding American Urban Life, 21 Omo ST. L.J. 274, 275 (1960). As one
conmmentator has observed:
Municipal Government has at least two advantages over state government. A
municipal administration is more responsive to the needs of local citizens, since
it must depend exclusively on these people for re-election. Second, a local government is more efficient to the extent that efficiency is increased by closeness to the
scene of operations and accessibility to the criticism and suggestions of the
persons governed.
Note, supra note 4, at 740. See also Fordham &: Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory
and Practice, 9 Omo ST. L.J. 18 (1948).
7. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. 18.
8. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. 7, § 22.
9. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 6, 8.
10. Wiley v. City of Berkeley, 136 Cal. App. 2d 10, 12, 288 P.2d 123, 125 (1955).
11. MICH, CoMl'. LAWS ANN.§ 117.4j(3) (1967).
12. The California courts have observed that there is no precise definition of

December 1972)

Notes

403

Michigan's home-rule provisions are not among the most extensive
as written, the Michigan courts have interpreted the provisions to allow a vigorous exercise of local authority by Michigan cities.
The source of the home-rule powers of Michigan cities is article
7, section 22, of the Michigan constitution:
Under general laws the electors of each city and village shall have
the power and authority to frame, adopt and amend its charter, and
to amend an existing charter of the city or village heretofore granted
or enacted by the legislature for the government of the city or village.
Each such city and village shall have power to adopt resolutions and
ordinances relating to its municipal concerns, property and government, subject to the constitution and law. No enumeration of powers
granted to cities and villages in this constitution shall limit or restrict
the general grant of authority conferred by this section.13
This provision is not of the "self-executing" type, and therefore the
constitutional grant of power is implemented through Michigan's
home-rule statutes, which delegate to home-rule cities, such as Ann
Arbor, the authority to act
to advance the interests of the city, the good government and prosperity of the municipality and its inhabitants and through its regularly constituted authority to pass all laws and ordinances relating
to its municipal concerns subject to the constitution and general
laws of the state.14
"municipal affairs." Dairy Belle Farms v. Brock, 97 Cal. App. 2d 146, 154, 217 P.2d
704, 708 (1950). Instead, the determination is one of degree. Certain concerns may
be characterized as "strictly" or "essentially" municipal affairs, while others may be
"partaking of the characteristics of a municipal affair" and yet encompass a far
greater scope of interest than strictly municipal matters. Brewer v. Feigenbaum, 47
Cal. App. 2d 171, 176, 117 P.2d 737, 740 (1941). If there is any reasonable doubt as to
whether a particular matter is a municipal affair, the courts will resolve the matter
against the municipality and deny the power. Dairy Belle Farms v. Brock, 97 Cal.
App. 2d at 154, 217 P.2d at 709.
Municipal control over municipal affairs is "independent of general laws" (see
text accompanying note 10 supra) only when a matter is exclusively a municipal
affair. The independence disappears as statewide interests begin to coincide with local
interests. As the California supreme court recently noted in Lancaster v. Municipal
Court for the Beverly Hills Judicial District of Los Angeles County, - Cal. 3d -,
494 P.2d 681, 682, 100 Cal. Rptr. 609, 610 (1972):
[A] local municipal ordinance is invalid if it attempts to impose additional requirements in a field that is pre-empted by general law. • • • Local legislation in
conflict with general law JS void. Conflicts exist if the ordinance duplicates • • •
contradicts ••• or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly
or by legislative implication • • • • If the subject matter or field of the legislation has been fully occupied by the state, there is no room for supplementary
or complementary local legislation, even if the subject were otherwise one properly
characterized as a "municipal affair."
Comparing the law of California with that of Michigan (see notes 12-23 supra
and accompanying text) it becomes apparent that despite the constitutional variations
in the scope of power, the practical powers of California and Michigan cities are
str.ikingly similar.

13. MICH. CoNST, art. 7, § 22.
14. MICH, CoMP. LAws ANN. § 117.4j(3) (1967).

404

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 71:400

Both the statute and the constitution expressly limit home-rule
powers to control over areas of "municipal concern," a concept that
does not encourage facile definition. There has been a certain tendency in Michigan to link the municipal concern idea with the scope
of the police power.15 It has been held that except as limited by the
constitution or by statute the police power of home-rule cities is "of
the same general scope and nature as that of the State."16 This police power has been broadly defined and allows the flexibility necessary to deal with changing problems.17 The enacting body has the
discretion to determine what regulations are appropriate to protect
the public interest;18 and a person asserting the unconstitutionality
of a municipal ordinance has the burden of showing that it has no
real or substantial relation to the public health, morals, safety, or general welfare.19
Yet, the fact that a locality can assert some measure of municipal
interest in an area of control does not necessarily bring that area
within the ambit of permissible local authority under the meaning
of the "municipal concern" language of the constitution and the enabling statute. Most problems are of concern both to the State and
the cities, and the inquiry focuses on the degree to which one or the
other might be concerned, or perhaps which entity has the primary
concern. As one commentator has observed:
15. See, e.g., Watnick v. City of Detroit, 365 Mich. 600, 113 N.W.2d 867 (1962);
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 355 Mich. 227, 93 N.W.2d 888 (1959),
afjd., 362 U.S. 440 (1960); People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 17 N.W.2d 193 (1945); Eanes
v. City of Detroit, 279 Mich. 531, 272 N.W. 896 (1937).
16. People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 315, 17 N.W.2d 193, 196 (1945). A rather narrow
view of municipal powers was expounded in the early cases of Attorney General v.
City of Detroit, 225 Mich. 631, 196 N.W. 391 (1923), and City of Kalamazoo v. Titus,
208 Mich. 252, 175 N.W. 480 (1919). Attorney General v. City of Detroit held that a
municipality exercised the police power only as an agent of the State, and in such
capacity it could not set state policy by regulating areas of statewide concern. This
concept precluded local wage and hour regulation in Attorney General v. City of
Detroit, and local fixing of public utility rates in Titus, People v. Sell upheld a
Detroit ordinance enforcing federally set wartime price ceilings on commodities. This
ordinance can be viewed as a local exercise of the police power in an area of statewide
concern. But the impact of Sell as precedent is limited by the court's reliance on the
wartime emergency circumstances which necessitated the ordinance, as well as the
fact that it merely augmented a state price ceiling statute which was already in effect.
17. In People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 315-16, 17 N.W.2d 193, 196 (1945), the Michigan supreme court stated:
The "police power" is • • • a power or organization of a system of regulations
tending to the health, order, convenience, and comfort of the people and to the
prevention and punishment of injuries and offenses to the public•••• It embraces
all rules and regulations for the protection of life and the security of property
• • . • It has for its object the improvement of social and economic conditions
affecting the community at large and collectively with a view to bring about "the
greatest good of the greatest number." Courts have consistently and wisely de•
dined to set any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for the exercise of this
power. It is elastic and is exercised from time to time as varying social conditions
demand correction.
18. Cady v. City of Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 286 N.W. 805 (1939).
19. Austin v. Older, 283 Mich. 667, 278 N.W. 727 (1938).
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The courts have, generally speaking, been unable to devise any
objective test whereby it can be determined with certainty what
matters come within the term "municipal affairs," for the term has
no fixed quantity, fluctuates with every change in the conditions
upon which it operates, and has of necessity been determined by a
slow process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.20

The elusive nature of the municipal concern idea may justify the
Michigan courts' unwillingness to propose expansive or general definitions. The issue is more amenable to a subtle balancing process,
weighing the sometimes conflicting interests of the cities and the
state, considering the advantages to be derived in each case from
broader local powers as opposed to more uniform regulation by the
state. For example, a court might properly weigh the relative efficiency of local and state governments in the regulation of any given
activity, the interest of local citizens in responsive implementation of
local policies, and the possibility that local ordinances will interfere
with the operation of statewide objectives or procedures. Such balancing of state and local interests seems implicit in decisions of the
municipal concern issue; but whereas the balancing process is outlined in decisions of other jurisdictions,21 the Michigan courts have
not overtly subscribed to this approach. 22 In any event, the municipal
concern question has traditionally been dealt with on a case-by-case
basis in Michigan, resulting in lists of inclusion and exclusion.23
20. C. RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW 64 (1957).
21. E.g., State ex rel. Heinig v. City of Milwaukee, 231 Ore. 473, 480-85, 373 P.2d
680, 684-87 (1962).
22. In a slightly different context the Michigan supreme court made some observations that may be pertinent to the municipal concern issue. In Miller v. Fabius Twp.
Bd., 366 Mich. 250, 114 N.W.2d 205 (1962), the court addressed the issue of whether the
regulation of water skiing was a problem susceptible to local control under what is now
MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 41.181 (1967), a statute defining the scope of a township's
authority to enact ordinances. The court noted:
'While the general problem with reference to water skiing and motorboating
and the use of our inland lakes by different classes of sportsmen are statewide
problems, there are peculiar circumstances that are local in character-such as
the number of boat users on the lake; the amount of fishing on the lake; the
congestion and conflict between fishermen and water skiers; the location of the
lake to densely populated areas-which the 1959 amendment authorizes townships
to deal with under the "health and safety of persons and property" clause.
366 Mich. at 259, 114 N.W.2d at 209 (emphasis added). Although the court did not
explicitly balance the state interest in regulation against the local interest, it recognized that even in areas of statewide concern, peculiar local circumstances may create
a need for local regulation. Such an analysis might be equally applicable to the
municipal concern question and might well produce results similar to a balancing
approach.
23. The Michigan courts have found the following areas to be within the scope of
the "municipal concern" requirement: Watnick v. City of Detroit, 365 Mich. 600, 113
N.W.2d 876 (1962) (Sunday closing laws); Huron-Portland Cement Co. v. City of
Detroit, 355 Mich. 227, 93 N.W.2d 888 (1959), affd., 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (air pollution);
People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 17 N.W.2d 193 (1945) (municipal enforcement of federal
wartime commodity controls); Eanes v. City of Detroit, 279 Mich. 531, 272 N.W.2d
896 (1937) (regulation of barber shops).
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In determining whether the Ann Arbor marijuana ordinance
deals with an area of municipal concern, it must be noted that the
same strong presumption of constitutionality applies to a city ordinance as to a state statute,24 and such presumption must be overcome
by a showing of unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.2is
In response to an opinion by Attorney General Frank Kelly,26
and in an effort to comply expressly with the municipal concern requirement, the City Council of Ann Arbor inserted in the ordinance
a section that specifically identifies a local problem.27 The ordinance
speaks of a particular concern for the youth of the community, "present here as University students or otherwise," and seeks to "preserve
the respect of such citizens for the law and its processes. " 28 Justice Williams of the Michigan supreme court has suggested that rational legislation with respect to marijuana should serve this same
purpose.29 The Council may also have recognized a widespread use
of marijuana within the City, and acted to prevent the strain on
community relations between youth and the police that might have
resulted were enforcement of harsh state penalties to continue.30 A
related aspect of this problem is the criminalization of the City's citizens who use marijuana; such citizens, through fear of enforcement
of the strict state laws might come to regard the police as adversaries,
rather than as public servants who can be relied upon for aid and
The case law has held the following to be of statewide concern, thus beyond the
regulatory power of municipalities: Attorney General v. City of Detroit, 225 Mich.
631, 196 N.W. 391 (1923) (regulation of hours of labor and the minimum wage); City
of Kalamazoo v. Titus, 208 Mich. 252, 175 N.W. 480 (1919) (fixing of rates for public
utilities). The Michigan courts generally have not invalidated ordinances on the
ground that they do not relate to municipal concerns. The tendency has been to find
that where the legislature has acted with regard to areas of statewide concern, such
statutes are pre-emptive. See, e.g., City of Grand Haven v. Grocer's Co-operative Dairy,
330 Mich. 694, 48 N.W.2d 362 (1951).
24. People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 314, 17 N.W.2d 193, 195 (1945). See also Goldstein
v. City of Hamtramck, 227 Mich. 263, 198 N.W. 962 (1924).
25. Cady v. City of Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 505, 286 N.W. 805, 807 (1939):
A statute will be presumed to be constitutional by the courts unless the contrary
clearly appears; and in case of doubt every possible presumption not clearly
inconsistent with the language and subject matter is to be made in favor of the
constitutionality of legislation •••• [I]t is only when invalidity appears so clearly
as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of the
Constitution that a court will refuse to sustain its validity.
See also text accompanying note 19 supra.
26. MlcH. ATTY. GEN. OP., March 9, 1971.
27. See note I supra.
28. ANN .ARBOR, MICH., CITY CODE tit. IX, ch. 108, § 9:62(29) (1972), set out in note I
supra.
29. People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 130-31, 194 N.W.2d 878, 895 (1972) (concurring
opinion).
30. See J. KAPLIN, MARIJUANA: THE NEW PROHIBITION 33-36, 39-40 (1970); H. PACKER,
THE LIMrrs OF nm CRIMINAL SANCTION 340-41 (1968); Note, Possession of Marijuana
in San Mateo County: Some Social Costs of Criminalization, 22 STAN. L REv. 101, 118-21
(1968).
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protection.81 This attitude could diminish community cooperation
with the police in other, perhaps more critical, areas of police work.
By reducing the marijuana penalties, the City has de-emphasized the
offense, a result of which could not only be an improvement in
police-community relations hut also a reordering of enforcement priorities and a reallocation of police resources to more serious criminal
activities. The ordinance may have been enacted in response to a
growing lack of respect for the legal system among young people who
believe that the marljuana prohibition is discriminatory because one
class of persons is subjected to harsh criminal sanctions for the use
of one recreational drug, marijuana, while another class of persons
has general approval for the use of alcohol, another recreational
drug. 82 By reducing the stigma, the inconvenience, and the financial
cost of a marijuana conviction, the City can claim to he minimizing
a cause of citizen disrespect for the law and its processes.88
There are, on the other hand, arguments for viewing marijuana
regulation as a matter of statewide concern. The State can claim that
Ann Arbor is not unique, that marijuana use in Ann Arbor is no
less contrary to an expressed state policy than it is anywhere else in
the State, and that uniform enforcement of state laws regulating the
31. See authorities cited in note 30 supra. These local interests might satisfy the
"peculiar circumstances" test that the court applied under the township statute if
the court chose to extend this test to the "municipal concern" question under the
home-rule provision of the constitution. See note 22 supra.
32. In a concurring opinion in People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 105-15, 194 N.W.2d
878, 881-87 (1972), Justice Swainson marshalled numerous studies and reports in
a carefully documented comparison between the effects of marijuana and alcohol.
Relying on THE INTERIM REPORT OF THE CANADIAN GoVERNMENT CO!d:MISSION OF INQUIRY,
Tm: NON-MEDICAL USE OF DRUGS 116-17, 122-23 (1970) [hereinafter CANADIAN COMMISSION]; L. GRINSPOON, MARIJUANA RECONSIDERED 39-61 (1971); J. KAPLIN, supra note 30,
at 139-41; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND .ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: NARCOTICS AND DRUG .ABUSE 13-14, 25 (1967); REPORT BY THE: .ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON DRUG DEPENDENCE 12-13, 16, 20-21 (1968) (British Report); Bonnie
& Whitebread, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the
Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REv. 971, 1105-07 (1970),
he concluded that marijuana is not addictive, does not lead to the use of "hard"
drugs, does not lead to violent crimes by the user, does not adversely affect psychomotor response (e.g., driving abilities), and has no adverse physical effects on the
user. Citing the CANADIAN CoMMISSION at 43, 70-72, J. KAPLIN at 275-320, and the
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND .ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: DRUNKENNESS 35 (1967), he observed that alcohol, by comparison, is
shown to be addictive, is clearly linked with the commission of violent crimes, and
excessive use is associated with death of brain cells, mental deterioration, and cirrhosis
of the liver.
33. However, it is arguable that the very coexistence of two distinct penalty schemes
applicable to the same conduct will in itself cause people to view the legal policies
underlying the prohibition as somewhat schizophrenic. In addition, the local interests
that Ann Arbor asserts may be different from the interests of the rest of the State
only as a matter of degree due to the fact that there is a greater concentration of
young people in Ann Arbor because of the presence of the University. This may suggest that the limitation of marijuana offense penalties is really a matter of statewide
concern which is simply more aggravated in Ann Arbor.
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use of drugs is appropriate because of the statewide nature of the
problem. By providing a shelter for marijuana violators, Ann Arbor
may impede the ability of the State to suppress drug traffic throughout the State. This last danger, however, will be minimized to the
extent that the City exercises its retained discretion to accede to
prosecution of "traffickers" under state law.3'1 Moreover, no reason
appears why Ann Arbor's interest need be unique to justify control
over a matter of great local significance.
Under the suggested balancing approach, it would appear that
there are legitimate local interests furthered by the Ann Arbor marijuana ordinance which may be sufficient to prevail over the state
interests involved. Thus, the Ann Arbor marljuana ordinance is
capable of meeting the constitutional requirement of relation to a
"municipal concern." The Michigan courts, however, have not expressly engaged in balancing in their treatment of the "municipal
concern" issue, but perhaps have merged these policy considerations
into their analysis of pre-emption and conflict.85 Indeed, the Michigan courts have decided the vast majority of the cases dealing with
municipal ordinances without ever mentioning the municipal concern requirement. The courts routinely uphold convictions under
local ordinances, the implication being that such ordinances are
valid exercises of the local police power, and the breadth accorded
the concept of municipal concern has rendered this constitutional
requirement somewhat ineffective as a limitation of the exercise of
municipal powers. This is not to suggest that such powers are unlimited. Rather, the Michigan courts have generally chosen to impose the appropriate limits on local authority by invoking the doctrines of pre-emption and conflict.
In light of Michigan's broad judicial interpretation of the municipal concern clause, it becomes apparent that there are many areas
where both the municipalities and the State can exercise legitimate
control. One check upon local power is the doctrine of pre-emption.
As with the municipal concern requirement, the pre-emption doctrine has its basis in the home-rule provision of the Michigan constitution.86 Since the home-rule powers are subject to the constitution and
general laws of the State, the courts have held that when the state
legislature has intended to pre-empt the field in a given area, any
local attempts at additional regulation in that area are void. When
the legislature has manifested the necessary intent, pre-emption occurs regardless of whether the local ordinance complements or is
contradictory to the statute.
In Michigan, the determination of legislative intent is of necessity
34. See notes 78-79 &: 102-03 infra and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Walsh v. City of River Rouge, 385 Mich. 623, 189 N.W.2d 318 (1971).
86. Mica. CoNsr. art. 7, § 22, set out in text accompanying note l!l supra.
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made without the benefit of any recorded legislative history, and
proceeds essentially on the basis of other guides to statutory interpretation. Thus, the nature and extent of the inquiry pursued by the
courts in determining the legislative intent has varied considerably.
In Walsh v. City of River Rouge,81 the Michigan supreme court engaged in a thorough analysis of the state legislation. Walsh involved
a Michigan statute granting emergency powers to the Governor, and
a city ordinance granting similar powers to the mayor. Since the
statute itself provided for discretionary grants of emergency power
by the Governor to mayors, the court reasoned that the legislature
intended that such powers be withheld from mayors absent a specific
gubernatorial delegation thereof. Consequently, the statute was considered to embody a "legislative intent to lodge exclusive powers in
the Governor, thereby pre-empting the field from local govemments,"38 thus rendering the ordinance void.
In Richards v. City of Pontiac,89 the Michigan supreme court also
found a state statute to be pre-emptive, but did so without the benefit
of the forceful reasoning found in Walsh. The Richards court considered whether the Michigan legislature, in passing a trailer park
act, had intended to pre-empt the field, rendering ultra vires a municipal attempt at additional control. The court described the provisions
of the act, and, citing nothing more than the comprehensive nature
of the statute and its general application throughout the State to cities
as well as rural areas, stated in conclusory fashion that its "intent and
purpose is to take over the entire field of regulation and supervision
of trailer parks in the State."40 The reasoning of the court is not
entirely persuasive, for the factors cited by the court do not compel
the conclusion that the legislature intended to occupy the field and
preclude concurrent municipal regulation.
In other cases the Michigan courts have attached considerable
significance to the presence or absence of express language reserving
exclusive control in the legislature. In Noey v. City of Saginaw,41 a
city ordinance placed more restrictive closing hours on taverns than
those provided for by statute. The Michigan supreme court held the
ordinance void, noting that the State reserved, by legislative provision, " 'the sole right, power and duty to control the alcoholic beverage traffic .•. within the State.' " 42
The court mentioned the absence of such an express statement of
37. 385 Mich. 623, 189 N.W.2d 318 (1971).
38. 385 Mich. at 635, 189 N.W.2d at 324.
39. 305 Mich. 666, 9 N.W.2d 885 (1943).
40. 305 Mich. at 672, 9 N.W.2d at 888.
41. 271 Mich. 595, 261 N.W. 88 (1935).
42. 271 Mich. at 598, 261 N.W. at 89, quoting what is now MICH. CoMP. LAws .ANN.
§ 436.l (1967).
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legislative pre-emptive intent in upholding a city ordinance in Miller
v. Fabius Township Board.43 A city ordinance there imposed more
restrictive hours on water skiing than those imposed by the state
power-boating statute. Without any extensive analysis of the statute,
the court found that the legislature "certainly" did not intend to
pre-empt the field, and, furthermore, had they so intended, the
legislature "could have expressly stated pre-emptive control."44 It
may be suggested that the absence of express language establishing
pre-emptive intent was not the sole controlling factor in Miller, since
the court on other occasions has declined to find significance in such
a legislative omission.40 The court's conclusion that the legislature
did not intend pre-emption may have been influenced by its view
that "the ordinance was enacted to prevent the many dangers and
alleviate the congested local conditions that existed on Pleasant
Lake."46 In this respect it is worth noting that the Michigan supreme
court in Walsh expressly stated that the "legal question" of pre-emption would be resolved "against (the] background of competing policy considerations."41 Thus, this brief survey of Michigan case law
demonstrates that in the absence of a readily discernible legislative
intent the Michigan courts retain great flexibility in handling the
pre-emption issue.
Turning to a consideration of the Ann Arbor marijuana ordinance, the question for determination is whether the Michigan legislature intended to pre-empt the field of marijuana control by passage
of the Controlled Substances Act of 1971.48 Certain factors do militate toward a finding of pre-emptive intent. First, the Act is very
comprehensive in scope-marijuana is only one of many drugs regulated by the statute-and this factor was deemed relevant in Richards. Second, the argument that the State has an interest in the
uniform application of its drug laws might suggest a presumption
that the legislature intended exclusively to control marijuana-related
activities.
While these considerations have merit, a reading of the Act and
other factors indicate an absence of legislative pre-emptive intent.
First, there is no provision in the Controlled Substances Act reserving exclusive control in the "administrator" of the Act.49 In a rather
43. 366 Mich. 250, 114 N.W.2d 205 (1962).
44. 366 Mich. at 258, 114 N.W.2d at 208.
45. See, e.g., Walsh v. City of River Rouge, 385 Mich. 623, 189 N.W.2d 318 (1971);
Richards v. City of Pontiac, 305 Mich. 666, 9 N.W.2d 885 (1943).
46. 366 Mich. at 258, 114 N.W.2d at 208.
47. 385 Mich. at 634-35, 189 N.W.2d at 324.
48. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 335.301-.367 (Supp. 1972).
49. " 'Administrator' means the state board of pharmacy or its designated or established authority." Mica. CoMP. LAws ANN.§ 335.303(2) (Supp. 1972). The Act does vest
discretion in the administrator to reclassify or delete controlled substances from the
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analogous type of legislation, the Michigan Liquor Control Act of
1933,110 the legislature provided for the creation of the liquor control
commission,111 and provided also that "the commission shall have the
sole right, power and duty to control the alcoholic beverage traffic
• . . within the state of Michigan.''112 The omission of such a clause
from the Controlled Substances Act may suggest the absence of a
legislative intent to pre-empt concurrent local regulation,113 as the
Michigan supreme court noted in Miller. Second, section 44 of the
Controlled Substances Act provides: "Any penalty imposed for violation of this act is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction otherwise authorized by law.''114
While this provision was presumably not drafted in contemplation
of concurrent munipical control, it nonetheless makes clear that the
Act does not contemplate pre-emption of all additional regulation
and penalties.1111
The brief survey and analysis of Michigan cases such as Walsh
and Miller establish the principle that absent clearer indications of
legislative intention, policy considerations properly may be raised in
support of the Ann Arbor marijuana ordinance in response to a preemption challenge. This principle is not inconsistent with the fact
that legislative intent is the touchstone of pre-emption. The Michiproscriptions of the Act on the basis of such factors as the state of the scientific
knowledge, patterns of abuse, and risk to the public health. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.
§ 335.311 (Supp. 1972). Such a broad grant of discretionary power might evidence a
legislative intention of providing sufficient flexibility to obviate the necessity of local
regulation.
50. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 436.1-.58 (1967). The two laws are parallel in many
respects. Both the Controlled Substances Act and the Liquor Control Act regulate and
control the availability of substances which are prone to abuse and which possess
habit forming characteristics. Both Acts provide for licensing distributors {MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 335.332 (Supp. 1972), 436.17-.28 (1967)), regulation of labeling
(MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 335.331 (Supp. 1972), 436.46-.46a (1967)), revocation of
licenses (MICH. CoMP. LAws .ANN. §§ 335.334 (Supp. 1972), 436.20-.21, 436.51 (1967)), and
for programs to combat abuse of the substances (MICH. COMP. LAws .ANN. §§ 335.358
(Supp. 1972), 436.47a (1967)).
51. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.5 (1967).
52. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 436.1 (1967).
53. The Michigan Legislature is not hesitant to include pre-emptive clauses in
legislation. The Liquor Control Act is but one example. The uniformity provision
of the state motor vehicle code, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 257.605 (1967), reads:
The provisions of this chapter shall be applicable and uniform throughout this
state and in all political subdivisions and municipalities therein and no local
authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance, rule or regulation in conflict
with the provisions of this chapter.
This clause does permit concurrent regulation but requires that it be strictly uniform,
and it is pre-emptive of divergent local law.
54. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 335.344 (Supp. 1972).
55. On the other hand, the specific mention of civil and administrative proceedings
coupled with the omission of any reference to criminal proceedings might be read as
evidence of an intention to pre-empt the field of criminal regulation of controlled
substances.
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gan legislature, particularly in light of the recent enactment in 1971
of the Controlled Substances Act, must have been aware of the
competing policies that were outlined above in the discussion of
municipal concemli6 and surely acted to promote what was deemed,
on balance, sound policy.
It was suggested above that the municipality's interest in encouraging respect for the law and its processes, in providing responsive
and efficient local government, and in maintaining a healthy level
of autonomy outweigh the State's interest in uniform control of
marijuana-related activities. What a court would view as the probable legislative judgment in balancing these factors may affect the
determination of the pre-emption issue. Significantly, to the extent
that municipal ordinances benefit from a presumption of constitutionality,57 a court should require substantial evidence that establishes pre-emptive legislative intent to void the Ann Arbor marijuana ordinance.
In areas not pre-empted by the State, "the 'rule' has long been recognized that municipalities are not divested of all control even where
the legislature has enacted laws." 58 I£ the Controlled Substances Act
was not intended to be pre-emptive, the Ann Arbor marijuana ordinance would be allowed to stand unless the provisions of the ordinance are in conflict with those of the statute.59 The conflict principle is again based upon the constitutional home-rule provision,
specifically the limiting phrase "subject to the constitution and
law." 60 The words "subject to" have consistently been given the
judicial construction of "not in conflict with," 61 and the general
rule succinctly states that "if a city ordinance prohibits something
which a State statute permits, or vice versa, there is a conflict and
the State law must prevail."62 The "vice versa" suggests, of course,
the existence of a conflict when a city ordinance permits conduct
56. See notes 26-35 supra and accompanying text.
57. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
58. Miller v. Fabius Twp. Bd., 366 Mich. 250, 257, 114 N.W.2d 205, 208 (1962).
59. It should be noted that the courts have not always drawn bright lines between
their analytical treatment of the conflict and pre-emption issues, See, e.g., Noey v.
City of Saginaw, 271 Mich. 595, 261 N.W. 88 (1935). In Miller v. Fabius Twp. Bd., 366
Mich. 250, 258, 114 N.W.2d 205, 208-09 (1962), however, the court expressly engaged in
a two-step process, reaching the conflict issue only after deciding that the ordinance
was not pre-empted by the statute,
60. MICH. CONST. art, 7, § 22, set out in text accompanying note 13 supra.
61. See, e.g., People v. Pickett, 339 Mich. 294, 63 N.W .2d 681 (1954); Conroy v.
City of Battle Creek, 314 Mich. 210, 22 N.W.2d 275 (1946); People v. Sell, 310 Mich.
305, 17 N.W.2d 193 (1945); Noey v. City of Saginaw, 271 Mich. 595, 261 N.W. 88 (1935);
People v. McGraw, 184 Mich. 233, 150 N.W. 836 (1915).
62. Builder's Assn, v. City of Detroit, 295 Mich. 272, 277, 294 N.W. 677, 679 (1940).
See also City of Grand Haven v. Grocer's Co-operative Dairy, 330 Mich. 694, 48 N.W.2d
362 (1951); Richards v. City of Pontiac, 305 Mich. 666, 9 N.W,2d 885 (1943); National
Amusement Co. v. Johnson, 270 Mich. 613, 259 N.W. 342 (1935).
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prohibited by statute. Traditional conflict issues come most clearly
into focus when both a city and the State act to regulate the same
realm of activity with laws containing similar, though not identical,
prohibitive provisions. At what point does permissible concurrent
regulation become unconstitutional conflict and contravention? The
Michigan supreme court has noted that the question is "difficult
of solution, and cannot be determined by any fixed rule. Each particular case must be determined as it arises." 63
This approach has hindered the development of any cohesive
rubric, and analysis of the case law reveals a certain lack of harmony
among the decisions. In People v. McDaniel, 64 the Michigan supreme
court considered a municipal ordinance that prohibited the use of
motor boats having engines of greater than five horsepower on a local
lake. The State of Michigan had also legislated to control power
boating, and required, inter alia, that power boats be equipped with
specified sound control devices. Although the court acknowledged
the municipal concern in eliminating the excessive disturbance to
lakeshore residents caused by the larger power boats, the court held
that the ordinance did in fact prohibit that which the statute permitted, and was consequently void.
An ordinance alleged to be in conflict with an amendment to the
same power-boating statute was the object of the court's attention
in a more recent case, Miller v. Fabius Township Board.65 It was contended that an ordinance prohibiting water skiing between the hours
of four p.m. and ten a.m. was in conflict with a section of the statute
that prohibited water skiing during the period one hour after sunset
until one hour before sunrise. Under the reasoning of McDaniel it
would indeed seem that the ordinance prohibited that which the
statute permitted, thus rendering the ordinance void. The Michigan
supreme court, however, found that since the statute was not intended to be pre-emptive66 and the field was amenable to additional
regulation by the municipality, the town could properly prohibit that
which the statute did not expressly permit.67 This appears to be a
more liberal view of the scope of permissible municipal authority
than that envisioned in People v. McDaniel, which was cited by the
dissent but ignored by the majority in Miller. Although McDaniel
was not expressly overruled in Miller, the two cases are not easily
reconciled. Miller may therefore suggest an increasing judicial sensitivity to the special concerns of municipalities.
63. National Amusement Co. v. Johnson, 270 Mich. 613, 616, 259 N.W. 342, 343
(1935).
64. 303 Mich. 90, 5 N.W.2d 667 (1942).
65. 366 Mich. 250, 114 N.W.2d 205 (1962).
66. See text accompanying notes 43-46 supra.
67. 366 Mich. at 258, 114 N.W.2d at 208-09.
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While Miller and McDaniel treat the conflict issue as it relates to
conflicting substantive provisions, it should be noted that in the case
of the Ann Arbor marijuana ordinance, the question of conflict, if
any, is more subtle. Since both the statute and ordinance provide
some sanction for essentially similar conduct, it would not appear
that a conflict arises within the literal terms of the general rule: The
ordinance, while providing a different and lesser penalty, does not
literally permit what the statute prohibits. On the other hand, it is
arguable that the significantly lesser penalty of the ordinance conflicts with the legislative policy of the statute by implicitly condoning conduct which is prohibited by the statute and thereby undermining the statute's deterrent effect.68 This conflict of policy,
however, may be more appropriately dealt with under the municipal
concern balancing approach or under the pre-emption doctrine.
It is significant that the Ann Arbor marijuana ordinance makes
punishable as a misdemeanor certain offenses that are considered
felonies under the statute. For example, selling or giving away marijuana is a misdemeanor under the ordinance, while "delivery" is a
felony under the statute.69 In some jurisdictions changing the classification of an offense from a felony to a misdemeanor might be conclusive evidence of a conflict.70 Michigan does not adhere to this rule.
Michigan courts have held that "a felony in this State is distinguishable from a misdemeanor as a grade of crime only by reason of the
place and severity of punishment."71 It could be argued that even
this variation in degree creates a conflict sufficient to invalidate the
ordinance. However, the Michigan supreme court's treatment of a
case similar to that presented by the concurrent regulation of marijuana indicates that at least in certain instances an ordinance will
be upheld despite the fact that it provides lesser penalties for conduct than the applicable state law.
The early case of People v. Hanrahan 72 dealt with concurrent
regulation of prostitution by the City of Detroit and the State. Significantly, Hanrahan upheld a city ordinance that made punishable
as a misdemeanor an offense that the State made punishable as a
felony. The defendant was convicted under a city ordinance that
prohibited keeping a house of ill fame, and that provided for a fine
68. See Note, supra note 4, at 748.
69. See notes 1-2 supra. While MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 335.341 (Supp. 1972) makes
delivery a felony, § 335.46(2) provides that noncommercial distribution without remuneration and not to further a commercial purpose is only a misdemeanor.
70. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Coy, 182 N.E.2d 638 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962); Hanbury v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 182, 122 S.E.2d 911 (1961); City of Fort Worth v.
MacDonald, 293 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
71. People v. Beasley, 370 Mich. 242, 246, 121 N.W.2d 457, 459 (1963) (emphasis
added).
72. 75 Mich. 611, 42 N.W. 1124 (1889).
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not to exceed 500 dollars, or imprisonment for up to six months or
until such fine was paid. A statute barring similar and related conduct provided for a fine not to exceed 1,000 dollars or imprisonment
for not more than five years, or both. In affirming the validity of the
ordinance, the Michigan supreme court addressed itself to arguments
relevant to the instant problem of marijuana control. The court
first noted the argument for statewide uniformity of the criminal
laws
that it is the province of the legislature to declare what shall constitute crime, and to prescribe punishment therefore; that an offense
against the criminal laws of the State is the same offense in whatever
locality it is committed, and should subject the offender to the same
punishment.73

The court rejected this argument, finding such contentions "not
fundamental," 74 and noting that the legislature might make certain
acts criminal and punishable as felonies in some parts of the State
while those same acts, if done in different sections of the State, would
not be criminal at all. 75 The court expressed no dismay that municipalities could achieve the same result through the delegated lawmaking powers.
A second argument confronted by the court raised the prospect
that this authority for local control, "carried to its logical results,
would authorize each township in the State, and each county to have
its own code of criminal laws, differing from the others." 76 The court
responded to this approach by reasoning that although the legislature has the responsibility to determine what shall constitute a crime
and how it shall be punished, a portion of this responsibility and
authority was necessarily delegated to municipalities in order that
they might implement their mandate to protect the health, morals,
welfare, and good order of their communities.77 The court conceded
73. 75 Mich. at 617, 42 N.W. at 1126.
74. 75 Mich. at 617, 42 N.W. at 1126.
75. 75 Mich. at 617-18, 42 N.W. at 1126.
76. 75 Mich. at 618, 42 N.W. at 1126.
77. 75 Mich. at 618, 42 N.W. at 1127. See also Feek v. Township Bd., 82 Mich. 393,
411-12, 47 N.W. 37, 40 (1890):
[E]specially is it true where the constitution authorizes a delegation of legislative
power for local purposes-the legislature may suspend, or authorize legislation
which will necessarily operate to suspend, the general law in particular localities.
The principle is a recognition of the right of local self-government. One locality
may feel the need of different local regulations from another. The wants of a
ma1ority of its electors are respected in granting to the local municipality the
power to enact such laws relating to their internal affairs as the feelings and
wishes of the majority demand.
Feek, like Hanrahan, antedates the passage of the Home-Rule Act, yet its language
concerning "delegation of legislative power for local purposes" becomes more significant in light of the subsequent enactment. The local police powers noted in Hanrahan, which gained statutory support in the Home-Rule Act (see notes 15-19 supra
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the possibility of internecine strife and bitterness caused by arbitrary
and inconsistent criminal laws in neighboring communities, but
denied that any real likelihood of such a situation was present. The
court also reasoned that
[if such abuse of the local power] should be attempted, and result in
wrong or oppression to the people, the remedy is in their hands. The
legislators are chosen by them, and it is in their power to effect any
needed reform.1s
The Hanrahan case is not without weaknesses as precedent for
similar resolution of a "conflict" problem in the home-rule context.
Hanrahan was decided in 1889, well before the 1908 passage of the
Michigan Home-Rule Act. The special charter passed by the legislature for the City of Detroit specifically authorized the City to act
to " 'prohibit, prevent, and suppress the keeping and leasing of houses
of ill fame.' " 79 The general conflicts rule that the city cannot permit
what the statute prohibits is applicable "in the absence of specific
statutory or charter power in the municipality.'' 8° Certainly Hanrahan could be distinguished on this ground. Nevertheless, the rationale underlying the court's holding seems to be based upon the
general authority that the legislature delegated to municipalities to
act in protection of the public order, health and welfare; the very
same authority that was later embodied in the Home-Rule Act. The
Michigan court has not felt constrained to limit the principles of
Hanrahan to ordinances suppressing prostitution, but rather has
recognized the breadth of its holding by citing it in support of local
control in diverse areas.81 The reasoning in Hanrahan supports later
Michigan decisions that deal with the scope of municipal control
after the passage of the Home-Rule Act:
The [Home-Rule Act] was passed in obedience to a mandate of ... the
Constitution .... The new system is one of general grant of rights
and powers, subject only to certain enumerated restrictions, instead
of the former method of only granting enumerated rights and powers
definitely specified.s2
and accompanying text), would be ineffective without the concomitant power to enact
ordinances for their enforcement.
78. 75 Mich. at 619, 42 N.W. at 1127.
79. 75 Mich. at 614, 42 N.W. at 1125 quoting Local Acts of 1883, ch. 7, § 47, at 611.
80. National Amusement Co. v. Johnson, 270 Mich. 613, 616, 259 N.W. 342, 343
(1935).
81. People v. Drost, 353 Mich. 691, 91 N.W.2d 851 (1958) (regulation of traffic
offenses); Eanes v. City of Detroit, 279 Mich. 531, 272 N.W. 896 (1937) (regulation of
barber shops); Brennan v. Recorder of the City of Detroit, 207 Mich. 35, 173 N.W.
511 (1919) (control of city streets); City of Alma v. Clow, 146 Mich. 443, 109 N.W. 853
(1906) (licensing of hawkers and peddlars); People v. Detroit White Lead Works, 82
Mich. 471, 46 N.W. 735 (1890) (public nuisance); Feek v. Township Bd., 82 Mich.
393, 47 N.W. 37 (1890) (liquor laws).
82. Gallup v. City of Saginaw, 170 Mich. 195, 199-200, 135 N.W. 1060, 1062 (1912).
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The general grant of powers described in this passage suggests the
same need for latitude in local action that Hanrahan endorses.
To the extent that Hanrahan remains viable, it suggests that a
reduction in the class of offense from felony to misdemeanor does
not create a fatal conflict. The social and political policies that underlie Michigan's determination to allow home-rule cities wide latitude
in the control of their affairs are no less persuasive when the city
makes a state felony punishable as a misdemeanor. Therefore, it is
suggested that the Ann Arbor marijuana ordinance does not create
a constitutionally significant conflict with the Controlled Substances
Act.
Given the present concurrent city and state regulation of marijuana-related offenses, the question remains whether impermissible
discretion is vested in the Ann Arbor City Attorney. The City of
Ann Arbor is without power to pre-empt or suspend the operation
of the state law within her city limits. Thus, the Ann Arbor City
Attorney recognizes the continuing validity of the statute in Ann
Arbor, and may refer marijuana offenders to the Washtenaw County
Prosecutor for disposition under the state law. While the city Attorney's Office has declined to specify the criteria for such a decision, stating that the problem is dealt with on a case-by-case basis, it
has been indicated that the quantity of marijuana involved is one
relevant factor. 83 Significantly, the previous Ann Arbor marijuana
ordinance, which was superseded by the present ordinance, provided that "it shall be a violation of this code to give away or sell
marijuana or cannabis, as so defined, not for profit and not as part
of a commercial distribution." 84 Although this distinction was not
included in the present ordinance, the mayor's oflice85 has indicated
that it was the Council's understanding in passing the present law,
that the commercial or noncommercial nature of the offense be considered before deciding whether or not to defer to county prosecution.
The present procedure may be simply described: Enforcement
See People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 312-13, 17 N.W.2d 193, 195 (1945):
A reading of the home-rule act shows that it is rather comprehensive in its provisions as to what the city may or may not incorporate in its charter, but it leaves
many things to be implied from the power conferred. • • • The purpose of the
legislative enactment was to give the city a large measure of home rule •••• Considering its purpose, it should be construed liberally and in a home rule spirit.
See also Village of Kingsford v. Cudlip, 258 Mich. 144, 148, 241 N.W. 893, 894 (1932):
"The provision for a general law for their incorporation was intended to confer upon
them almost exclusive rights in the control of their affairs, not in conflict with the Constitution or general laws applicable thereto.

83. Interview with Jerold Lax, Ann Arbor City Attorney. See note 108 infra.
84. Ord. 4-71, adopted March 8, 1971, as amended, ANN AruloR, MicH., CITY CoDE,
tit. IX, ch. 108, § 9:62(29) (1972).
85. Interview with Robert J. Harris, Mayor of Ann Arbor.
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within the city limits is handled almost exclusively by the Ann Arbor
Police Department.86 When the infrequent arrest is made by the
Washtenaw County Sheriff's Department or by the State Police, the
person arrested is invariably turned over to the Prosecutor's Office
for prosecution under the statute,87 for the Sheriff's Department and
the State Police have no mandate to enforce city law. After an arrest
has been made by the Ann Arbor Police for a marijuana offense, the
case is given to the City Attorney, who decides whether to prosecute
under the ordinance or to transfer the case to the County Prosecutor.88 Although city police can bring persons under their arrest to
the Prosecutor for authorization to prosecute, they uniformly bring
marijuana cases to the City Attorney, in accordance with an established, though unwritten, department procedure. 89 Thus, in practice
the discretion rests with the City Attorney, and not with the arresting officers.
It is common for a prosecuting officer to be faced with different
statutes or ordinances under which he could prosecute a given case,
and the law recognizes the propriety of such prosecutorial discretion.
As Judge, now Chief Justice, Burger observed in his concurring
opinion in Hutcherson v. United States: 90
The functions of a prosecutor afford examples of a wide variety of
powers to "select" the punishment in the sense argued by appellant,
and to select the forum. One is seen in the situation where the prosecutor in one jurisdiction elects to yield prosecution of an accused for
an offense to a jurisdiction which has capital punishment not available in the waiving jurisdiction. Similarly a prosecutor may elect to
prosecute or not to prosecute, or to indict for greater rather than lesser
included offenses on facts which reasonably support either.91
86. Since the ordinance has been in effect, there has been one arrest by authorities
other than the Ann Arbor Police. In that case a city resident called ,the State Police to
report that his neighbor was cultivating marijuana. The State Police responded and
made an arrest. Interview with Washtenaw County Prosecutor's Office.
87. Lax Interview, supra note 8!1.
88. Id.
89. Interview with Harold Olson, Ann Arbor Deputy Chief of Police.
90. 345 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
91. 345 F.2d at 970 n.5. Judge Burger continued: "The record before us shows that
the Attorney General has promulgated standards for the guidance of United States Attor•
neys in the exercise of their discretion in narcotics prosecutions." Judge Bazelon (con•
curring in part and dissenting in part) quoted the following portion of sections 86.2-.!l of
the United States Attorney's Manual:
"The principal object of enforcement is ••• to prosecute the importers, dealers and
traffickers •••. The emphasis should be on prosecutions of the sellers or purveyors,
particularly those who deal with minors, and not the mere addict possessors ••••
[C]riminal prosecutions of [addicts] in some instances may be justified so as to
compel an addict to undergo complete [rehabilitative] treatment. • • • [P]rosecutions for such minor offenses which are considered to be local in character may
well be and often are left to the state or local authorities. Not falling within such
minor category are cases against persons, whether addicts or not, who engage in
the importation or transportation or are in possession of these drugs under cir-
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The decision that confronts the Ann Arbor City Attorney under the
dual prohibitions of the statute and the ordinance is analogous to
that faced by the prosecutor who waives jurisdiction to a state that
has capital punishment.
Michigan law shares the acceptance of this discretion vested in
the prosecutor's office. In Murphy v. Weideman 92 a defendant was
first charged with driving without an operator's license in his possession, in violation of a local ordinance. The charge was dismissed
by the judge, and a complaint was issued under a state statute that
prohibited essentially the same conduct. Defendant, convicted under
the statute, then contended on appeal that he should have been tried
under the ordinance. The court found the contention to be without
merit, noting that the defendant "had no vested right to be tried
under the ordinance," since "[t]he prosecution might have been
brought in the first instance under the statute ...." 93
A different situation was presented in People v. Lombardo,94
where the defendant was prosecuted under a statutory felony, aiding
and abetting the keeping of a house of prostitution, rather than
under a misdemeanor statute that prohibited admitting any person
into a building for the purpose of prostitution. Whereas the alternative laws in Murphy proscribed the same conduct, the two statutes
in Lombardo proscribed different conduct. The Lombardo court
reached a similar result, however, holding that "[p]rosecuting officers have the right to use their discretion in determining under
which of applicable statutes a prosecution shall be instituted." 95 Although the result in Murphy is inconsistent with a requirement that
the two laws available to a prosecutor must contain different subcumstances reasonably indicating that the drugs were intended for use in the illegal
traffic."
345 F.2d at 975.
The standards that justified the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in Hutcherson are
similar to those employed by the Ann Arbor City Attorney. Both consider the quantity
of drugs involved, and the commercial or noncommercial nature of the offense. Neither
office has seen fit to specify quantitative criteria upon which discretion is exercised.
Significantly, discretion is justified in Hutcherson even though such discretion came
very close to a sentencing type decision. By electing to proceed under one statute, the
prosecutor in Hutcherson subjected the defendant to a more severe minimum sentence.
This would not normally be the case with the discretion exercised by Ann Arbor's City
Attorney, since the Controlled Substances Act provides no minimum sentences for first
offenders. With multiple offenders, however, the situation would more closely parallel
that of the Hutcherson case. The court has discretion to place a first offender on probation and may discharge such a person without an adjudication of guilt if he fulfills
the conditions of his probation but may not do so with a person who has been previously convicted under the Act or under any federal or state law relating to narcotic
drugs. MICH, COMP, LAws ANN. § 335.347(1) (Supp. 1972).
92. 340 Mich. 193, 65 N.W.2d 320 (1954) (The case appears under the title Recorder'&
Court Presiding Judge v. Third Judicial Circuit Judge in Michigan Reports.)
93. 340 Mich. at 199, 65 N.W.2d at 322.
94. 301 Mich. 451, 3 N.W.2d 839 (1942).
95. Mich. at 453, 3 N.W.2d at 839.
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stantive elements to justify the use of discretion, and the Lombardo
court does not expressly mention this as a basis for its holding,06
there are Michigan cases suggesting that the discretion is improper
if the prosecutor can choose between laws with identical substantive
provisions and varying penalties.07
For example, in People v. Ryan,98 the defendant was convicted
of a felony, voluntarily driving away the motor vehicle of another.
The defendant contended on appeal that another statute made
identical conduct a misdemeanor, and that the asserted difference in
punishment for the same crime rendered the discretion vested in the
prosecutor an unconstitutional delegation of authority to a nonjudicial officer. Significantly, the felony statute required the element of
scienter, which was expressly discarded in the misdemeanor statute.00
The court upheld the conviction, stating: "Since there is a distinction between the aforementioned statutes, it follows that the prosecutor had a right to use discretion in determining under which of
applicable statutes a prosecution shall be instituted."100 Thus, in
Ryan the prosecutor's discretion is grounded upon the distinct elements of the available charges, whereas in Murphy it is not. This
renders uncertain the presence of constitutional due process or equal
protection when the prosecutor exercises discretion in charging
either of two offenses with identical substantive elements but differing penalties.101
It is essential that the Ann Arbor City Attorney be vested with
discretion to prosecute under the ordinance or to turn the case over
to the County Prosecutor if a flexible system responsive to the dynamics of the individual cases is to develop. The Ann Arbor City
96. See also People v. Jackson, 29 Mich. App. 654, 185 N.W.2d 608 (1971).
97. People v. Mire, 173 Mich. 357, 138 N.W. 1066 (1912); People v. Graves, 31 Mich.
App. 635, 188 N.W.2d 87 (1971); People v. Ryan, 11 Mich. App. 559, 161 N.W .2d 754
(1968).
98. 11 Mich. App. 559, 161 N.W.2d 754 (1968).
99. Compare MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 750.413 (1967) (the felony statute) with
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.414 (1967) (the misdemeanor statute).
100. 11 Mich. App. at 561, 161 N.W.2d at 755-56.
101. This uncertainty is not limited to Michigan case law. A majority of the United
States Supreme Court declined to reach this issue in Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131
(1955), although it was considered by Justice Black in a vigorous dissent, 351 U.S.
at 139-40:
[T]wo statutes proscribe identical conduct and no "different .proof" was required to
convict petitioner of the felony than would have been reqmred to convict him of
the misdemeanor ••••
A basic principle of our criminal law is that the Government only prosecutes
people for crimes under statutes passed by Congress which fairly and clearly define the conduct made criminal and the punishment which can be administered.
This basic principle is fl.outed if either of these statutes can be selected as the
controlling law at the whim of the prosecuting attorney or the Attorney General

.A congressional delegation of such vast power would raise serious constitutional
questions.
0

•

•

December 1972]

Notes

421

Attorney, in deciding whether to prosecute a marijuana violator
under the ordinance, or to tum the case over to the County Prosecutor for disposition under the statute, may or may not be presented
with the availability of identical provisions depending upon the
offense charged. Both the ordinance and the statute proscribe the
"use" of marijuana. However, other provisions of the t\\TO laws contain different elements. For example, the ordinance states that no
person shall "give away or sell"102 marijuana, whereas the statute
prohibits "delivery"103 and "distribut[ion] ... without remuneration
and not to further commercial distribution."104 Prosecution may be
brought under the statute for constructive delivery,105 whereas a
constructive sale or gift is not expressly prohibited by the ordinance.
This distinction could justify a decision by the prosecuting officer
to let the case proceed under the statute, since this course could increase the likelihood of success in cases involving the more complex
forms of delivery. There is another variation: whereas the marijuana ordinance prohibits simple possession, the statute makes it unlawful for one "knowingly or intentionally"106 to possess a controlled
substance. The statutory element of scienter, absent from the
ordinance, might distinguish the two offenses and thereby justify
prosecutorial discretion even under the Ryan requirement of different elements in the available charges. Significantly, it is in the "use"
cases that the t\\To laws are most similar. Therefore, the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in a "use" case would be most susceptible
to attack under the Ryan standard. Yet, in such cases the City Attorney, under the criteria noted above,107 has the least margin for
discretion: The simple "use" cases are those which are most likely to
be dealt with under the ordinance, since they would typically involve
an insignificant amount of marijuana in a noncommercial setting.108
The discussion of the differing elements of the municipal and
statutory marijuana offenses also pertains to the issue of double
jeopardy. Specifically, if a person is convicted or acquitted of a marijuana offense under the Ann Arbor ordiJ1ance, can he then be prosecuted for the same criminal behavior under the Controlled Sub102. ANN .AruloR, MICH., CITY CODE, tit. IX, ch. 108, § 9.62(29) (1972), set out in note
l supra.

103. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 335.341(1) (Supp. 1972), set out in note 2 supra.
104. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 335.346(2) (Supp. 1972), set out in note 2 supra.
105. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 335.304(1) (Supp. 1972): "'Deliver' or 'delivery' means
the actual, constructive or attempted transfer from 1 person to another of a controlled
substance, whether or not there is an agency relationship."
106. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 335.341(4) (Supp. 1972), set out in note 2 supra.
107. See text accompanying notes 83-85 supra.
108. Since the present Ann Arbor ordinance has been in effect, the City Attorney has
prosecuted the vast majority of marijuana offenses under the ordinance. Only a few
cases, all of which involved substantial quantities of marijuana, have been shifted to
the Prosecutor's Office. Lax Interview, supra note 83.
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stances Act? To prevent the State from defeating the City's purpose of
lenient treatment of marijuana offenders, it is necessary that jeopardy
attach to the municipal trial barring subsequent state prosecution.
The Supreme Court has held that the double jeopardy provision
of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution is applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment.109 The Court recently took the opportunity to consider the double jeopardy problem
as it relates to successive prosecutions by a city and a state for the
same offense. In Waller v. Florida,11° a mural was stolen from a
municipal building. The mural was subsequently recovered in a
damaged condition by the police. The defendant was convicted of
destruction of government property under a local ordinance. After
serving his sentence, the defendant was then charged with and
convicted of grand larceny under a statute. The district court of
appeal upheld the conviction, disposing of the defendant's double
jeopardy argument by invoking the dual sovereign doctrine.m This
doctrine rests upon an analogy between the city-state relationship
and that of a state and the federal government: Since an offense can
simultaneously violate the laws of both sovereigns, both are entitled
to prosecute the violator. In rejecting this argument, the Supreme
Court stressed that cities are creations of the state, and derive their
municipal powers and authority therefrom.112 They are essentially
subdivisions of a sovereign state, and lack the independent source
of power associated with sovereigns. Thus, the Court held that
[t]he Florida courts were in error to the extent of holding that
"even if a person has been tried in a municipal court for the identical
offense with which he is charged in a state court, this would not be
a bar to the prosecution of such person in the proper state court."113

Waller changed the law in many jurisdictions,114 but it merely
served to reinforce what had long been the law in Michigan.115
Although Waller holds that a city and state cannot both prosecute a defendant for the same offense, it leaves unanswered the
critical question of what constitutes the "same" offense. Michigan
109. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
110. 397 U.S. 387 (1969).
111. Waller v. State, 213 S.2d 623 (1968).
112. 397 U.S. at 392-93.
113. 397 U.S. at 395, quoting 213 S.2d at 624.
114. Decisions of the states that appeared to treat municipalities and the state as
separate sovereigns for double jeopardy purposes at the time of Waller are listed by
the Court, 397 U.S. at 391-92 n.3.
115. People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611, 627-28, 42 N.W. 1124, 1130 (1889):
[Where there is concurrent regulation by city and state] prosecutions may be instituted under either law, and the court that first acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused has exclusive jurisdiction to hear, try, and determine the case;
and a conviction for an offense which is the same in both laws will be a bar to a
prosecution for the same offense under the other law.
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courts have traditionally responded to this question by application
of the "same evidence test."116 In Michigan this test is applied "to
ascertain whether the facts alleged in the second indictment would,
if given in evidence, have warranted a conviction on the fi.rst." 117
Application of this test to successive prosecutions by City and State
of marijuana offenses should be rather facile, and should lead to
predictable results. Successive prosecutions under the "use" provisions of both laws would clearly be for the same offense, and would
constitute double jeopardy. A city conviction or acquittal for
"possession" should bar a later state prosecution for knowing or
intentional possession, since the evidence necessary to prove the
latter would warrant a conviction on the initial misdemeanor charge.
Under this test, state charges of possession with intent to deliver,
or of delivery itself would be barred by a prior municipal conviction
or acquittal of simple possession.
There is additional protection afforded by statute:
If, upon the trial of any person for a misdemeanor, the facts given in
evidence amount in law to a felony, he shall not by reason thereof,

be entitled to an acquittal of such misdemeanor, and no person tried
for such misdemeanor shall be liable to be afterwards prosecuted
' for felony on the same facts, unless the court before which the trial
shall be had, shall discharge the jury from giving any verdict upon
such trial, and shall direct such person to be indicted for felony. 118

Thus, for example, if a person is tried under the ordinance for
violation of the possession provision and the facts given in evidence
constitute delivery under the statute, such person cannot later be
tried on those same facts for delivery, under the protection of both
the statute and the "same evidence test." The statute is also protective in cases not covered by the Michigan "same evidence test."
A person convicted of sale of marijuana under the ordinance might
properly, per the "same evidence test," have then been charged
under the Controlled Substances Act with possession with intent to
deliver, a felony, since the facts necessary to prove possession with
intent to deliver would not have warranted a conviction under the
municipal "sale" provision. Since, however, in the municipal prosecution for sale, evidence sufficient to show possession with intent
to deliver is likely to be presented at trial, later prosecution under
the possession with intent to deliver provision would be barred by
the statute.110
ll6. People v. Beverly, 247 Mich. 353, 79 N.W.2d 913 (1929); People v. Cook, 236
Mich. 333, 210 N.W. 296 (1926); People v. Compain, 38 Mich. App. 289, 196 N.W.2d 353
(1972).
ll7. People v. Cook, 236 Mich. 333, 335, 210 N.W. 296 (1926).
ll8. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 768.4 (1968).
119. Cf. People v. Beasley, 370 Mich. 242, 121 N.W.2d 457 (1963).
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Attempting to distinguish substantively the offenses charged is
but one way of evading the double jeopardy protection. Another
method is to demonstrate that the first proceeding was of such a
nature that jeopardy did not attach. In cases of successive prosecutions by City and State, the State might claim that jeopardy did
not attach to the municipal proceeding120 since the municipal
defendant, under the Ann Arbor marijuana ordinance, is subject
only to a fine.121 If a defendant's protection against double jeopardy
120. Indeed, it has long been argued in many jurisdictions (other than Michigan)
that even those municipal offenses punishable by a jail term are merely civil or petty
proceedings to which jeopardy does not attach. For a brief history of this theory, see
Gross, Successive Prosecutions by City and State-The Question of Double Jeopardy, 43
ORE. L. REv. 281 (1964). This argument is losing favor, however:
Where once successive prosecutions by city and state could be condoned because
of the insignificance of municipal punishment, today that is no longer the case.
Municipal prosecutions, exercising authority unparallelled at common law, meting
out penalties comparable to those imposed by higher state authority, can be considered as nothing less than prosecutions by the state itself.
Id. at 314.
The view expressed in United States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp. 899, 901 (D.D.C.
1958), revd. on other grounds, 271 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959), that "the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy .•• is applicable to all proceedings, irrespective of
whether they are denominated criminal or civil, if the outcome may be deprivation
of the liberty of the person" is more consonant with the policies underlying the double
jeopardy clause.
121. There is presently, however, some uncertainty on this point. A local judge
recently declared the penalty provision of the Ann Arbor Marijuana Ordinance unconstitutional. People v. Fuqua, No. CR-7595 (Mich. Dist. Ct., Sept. 28, 1972). The judge
did not reach the critical issues of conflict, pre-emption, or municipal concern, but
limited his ruling of unconstitutionality to the penalty provision. The thrust of the
opinion is that the City has unconstitutionally infringed upon the court's discretion to
impose sentences of up to 500 dollars and/or ninety days for violation of ordinances,
in that the City has specified a five dollar fine as the only permissible penalty upon
conviction under the marijuana ordinance. As authority for its finding the court cited
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 117.4(i) (1967), a section of the Home-Rule Act:
Each city may in its charter provide: for the punishment of those who violate its
laws or ordinances, but no punishment shall exceed a fine of $500 or imprisonment
for 90 days, or both, in the discretion of the court.
The court interpreted this statute to mean that the city exceeds its power, and intrudes into the judicial domain when it sets the penalty for violations of ordinances
below the statutory maximum. The judge failed to distinguish all other Ann Arbor
ordinances, none of which authorize a 500 dollar fine and/or a ninety day imprisonment (100 dollars and/or ninety days is the maximum provision in the Ann Arbor City
Code). The judge has ruled, in effect, that all Ann Arbor ordinances are unconstitutional, and, further, that if the City is to prohibit any activity (e.g., overtime parking)
it must allow the local judiciary to impose punishment of up to 500 dollars and/or
ninety days, in its discretion, for violations.
It is noteworthy that this issue was not raised by either of the parties, and was decided on the court's own motion. The judge also denied a city attorney the opportunity to argue the motion on the merits, although argument was heard at a later date.
The court's opinion will shortly be subjected to judicial review in the circuit court, on
appeal by the City.
If the district court finding is upheld, and the five dollar fine invalidated, the
severability clause of the City Code would act to continue the vitality of the marijuana
ordinance, and the general penalty provision of the Code (100 dollars and/or ninety
days) would then apply to the ordinance, unless the general penalty provision of the
entire code is held unconstitutional. The provisions of the ordinance would still differ
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were limited to that provided by the United States Constitution,
this argument might be successful. The provision of the fifth amendment is that "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb." 122 The federal courts
have never confronted the issue of whether jeopardy attaches to a
proceeding wherein conviction is punishable only by a fine, and
not by a jail sentence, and this remains an open question.123 Michigan law, however, is more clearly protective in this situation. The
double jeopardy clause of the Michigan constitution does not include the "life and limb" qualification,124 and Michigan case law
supports the principle that jeopardy attaches to municipal trials
regardless of the nature or the severity of the penalty sought to be
imposed: "A person is in jeopardy when he is put upon trial in a
court of justice charged with a violation of law.'' 1211 Municipal
ordinances have been described as possessing the full force of law:
An ordinance, validly enacted, prohibiting certain acts under fines,
penalties, or imprisonment, is within the jurisdiction of the municipality enacting it, as much entitled to respectful obedience, and is
as much the law of the land for that locality, as a law enacted by the
Legislature.126

It thus appears that regardless of whether violation of an ordinance
is punishable by a jail term or by a fine only, prosecution under an
ordinance is a bar to subsequent prosecution under a statute for the
same offense. Thus, the argument that jeopardy does not attach to
offenses punishable only by fine should not preclude jeopardy from
attaching to offenses prosecuted under the Ann Arbor marijuana
ordinance.
While the matter is not free from doubt, the foregoing analysis
has suggested that the Ann Arbor marijuana ordinance may be
supported as a valid exercise of municipal authority, even in the
face of challenges of pre-emption and conflict. Through the cooperative interaction of the municipal marijuana ordinance, the
double jeopardy bar, and the City Attorney's discretion to transfer
the most serious cases to the county for prosecution under the state
from those of the Controlled Substances Act, and the issues discussed herein would still
be relevant to the concurrent effect of the ordinance and the statute.
122, U.S. CoNsr. amend. V (emphasis added).
123, This issue has assumed greater significance since Waller applied double jeopardy to municipal trials because it is far more likely that offenses punishable only by
fine will be found in municipal ordinances rather than in the federal or state codes.
The case law suggests that "life and limb" should be read broadly. See Ex parte Lange,
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873); Clawans v. Rives, 104 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1939); United
States v. Farewell, 76 F. Supp. 35 (D. Alas. 1948).
124. MICH. CoNsr. art. 6, § l.
125. People v. PoweIS, 272 Mich. 303, 307, 261 N.W. 543, 544 (1935).
126. People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611, 620, 42 N.W. 1124, 1127 (1889).
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law, the City of Ann Arbor has effectively declared the following
proposition: Marijuana-related offenses-which are punishable as
felonies, with possible prison terms, or misdemeanors, with possible
jail terms, under the state law-will in most instances be punishable
only as misdemeanors subject to five dollar parking-ticket-like fines
if committed within the city limits. If the ordinance is upheld in
the courts, the broader implications of the power that Ann Arbor
has asserted will surely prove significant.
A broad construction of the home-rule powers coupled with the
application of the pre-emption and conflict doctrines only when
municipalities act in contravention of a readily discernible state
legislative intent would contribute a desirable, if not necessary,
element of flexibility to the efficient administration of government
in Michigan, a state with a broad rural constituency but with
pockets of urbanization such as Detroit, Lansing, Ann Arbor, Flint,
and Pontiac. Urban populations deal with different problems, are
influenced by different values, and envision different priorities than
their rural counterparts. One system of state law cannot always
reflect or serve best the interests of both, and when such discrepancies exist it seems appropriate for local legislation to supplement
state law.127
It is clear, however, that the obvious benefits to be derived from
flexibility are gained only at the expense of some uniformity in
statewide law enforcement. While there would remain a uniform
application of the state law in every county of the State, the conjunctive operation of enforcement of a differing local ordinance
and resultant double jeopardy bar would detract from the uniform
enforcement of state law. As in the case of marijuana-related offenses,
certain locally held values might lead to disrespect for the law and
its processes were any number of the State's criminal prohibitions
to be enforced strictly;128 and argument can also be made that the
127. A divergent local ordinance such as the one in question may help prompt the
passage of similar state legislation. Progressive local communities, if given the freedom,
can serve the function of Brandeis' famous laboratory experimenting with various
socially progressive ideals of law and government, See New State Ice Co. v. Lieb•
mann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). If such experiments prove
successful, the legislature might adopt laws making such ideals the state policy. The
impact of local legislation was noted by Governer Milliken in his Special Message to
the Legislature on Alcohol and Drug Abuse, March 4, 1971:
As public officials we must face squarely the need for a major revision of our laws
dealing with marijuana. The hypocrisy of our present law, which falsely classifies
marijuana as a narcotic, affects the credibility of our entire drug abuse program.
Recent federal legislation and the passage of local marijuana ordinances give new
urgency to the need for state action in this controversial area.
(Emphasis added.)
128. See H. PACKER, supra note 30, at 291; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCE•
MENT AND .ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPoRT: THE Com.n-s 75-76 (196'7). CJ.
Goldstein, Police Discretion Not To Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Deci•
sions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 586-88 (1960); Kadish, Legal
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failure of law enforcement officials to enforce unpopular laws fosters
the same such disrespect. 129 Therefore, grounds would exist, not
unlike those asserted by Ann Arbor, for a parade of concurrent
municipal regulation that would certainly appear horrible to those
who recognize the values of statewide uniformity of the criminal
law. Indeed, the spectre of each locality enacting its own criminal
code, is different only in degree from the situation presented by
the concurrent operation of the Ann Arbor marijuana ordinance
and the State's Controlled Substances Act.
While this problem does not admit of simple solution, it should
not be insurmountable. The most fundamental answer is that
municipalities are creatures of the State and, under the Michigan
constitution and home-rule statute, have a limited authority and
remain "subject to" the State's supreme command. Certainly the
checks embodied in the municipal concern requirement and the
pre-emption and conflict doctrines provide protection to the State
should a municipality act adversely to the state welfare. Absent a
clear indication of the legislative intent, the judicial determination
of the appropriate limits of municipal power in Michigan has been
shown to include, either expressly or implicitly, delicate questions
of balance. The flexibility inherent in such a judicial inquiry allows
careful consideration of the relevant competing policies, and renders
unnecessary the promulgation of an angular standard to which later
cases must be forced to conform. Finally, it should be kept in mind
that the judicial determination is not the ultimate one in regard
to these matters. Were the state legislature to take exception to
certain municipal ordinances, even if upheld in the courts, it clearly
would be within the power of the legislature to enact specific or
general pre-emptive statutes to ensure that no significant state policy
is impeded. Yet, as Michigan law has developed, no such scheme
of pre-emptive statutes has been necessary, and the home-rule powers
have been employed to secure to cities a healthy degree of autonomy
in regard to matters of local concern.
Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. R.Ev. 904, 90910 (1962).
129. Arnold, Law Enforcement-An Attempt at Social Dissection, 42 YALE L.J. 7-8
(1932).

